We consider a decision maker who follows a status quo without reconsidering her implicit decision at every period. Only as a result of certain events will she ask herself whether she would like to change her choice. We ask when this mode of decision making is compatible with optimality. We state conditions on the set of databases that would make the decision maker take an explicit decision, which are equivalent to the following representation: the decision maker entertains a set of theories, of which one is that her current choice is the best; she is inert as long as that theory beats any alternative theory according to a maximum likelihood criterion.
Introduction
Some decisions are taken, and some just happen. For example, assume that Mary wakes up in the morning and goes to work. She could have decided to quit her job on this day and start a job search. An outside observer who follows the revealed preference paradigm would view Mary as if she made a decision of not quitting, even if the thought did not cross her mind that particular morning. However, there are circumstances under which this ⇤ We thank for comments on earlier versions of this paper. Gilboa gratefully acknowledges ISF Grant 704/15.
† HEC, Paris-Saclay, and Tel-Aviv University. tzachigilboa@gmail.com ‡ HEC, Paris-Saclay. fan.wang1@hec.edu choice would be conscious and explicit. For example, Mary may receive some feedback on her job performance, positive or negative, which may make her wonder whether she won't be better o↵ in a di↵erent job or with a di↵erent employer. She might have heard of a friend who quit a similar job for a new one, or who changed his career altogether. Similarly, we may consider a person who, implicitly, makes a daily decision not to emigrate. Most days the decision would not be thought of as such, but certain events in the personal, professional, or political domains might prod him to consider the possibility of emigration consciously.
In this paper we consider the implicit decision to make an explicit decision.
We do not model the latter, but only the former. That is, we do not study the acts the decision maker would consider once she "wakes up"and makes a conscious decision. We only consider the binary decision of "make a conscious decision and check if the status quo seems to be optimal" vs. "remain inert and go about my business". While we tend to think of this decision as implicit and unconscious, it need not be irrational. A person who faces such a decision might engage in explicit, fully rational decision process and end up with the conclusion that the status quo is indeed her optimal choice.
Moreover, along the lines of "rational inattention" (Sims, 2003) , in many situations it might even be "more rational" to stick to the status quo without reconsidering it than to incur the cognitive and emotional costs involved in conscious decisions. Indeed, when considering the choice of a career or a country to live in, there is typically little that changes from day to day to warrant a full-fledged, conscious and explicit decision process. The question we ask is, when can one rationalize the implicit decision not to make an explicit one? Specifically, we consider a decision maker who (implicitly) entertains a set of theories, of which one, t 0 , is interpreted as "my current choice is optimal", and others suggest that various alternatives are better than the status quo. Each theory is represented by a statistical model, assigning probabilities to "cases". Given a database of cases, the decision maker's choice to stick to the status quo is rationalizable if t 0 is a maximizer of the likelihood function.
Cases in our model are abstract entities that may correspond to various pieces of information. In the job search example, cases may involve information about the decision maker, such as positive or negative reviews; about others, such as the fact that another person changed her job; or about no one in particular, such as the news that there is higher demand for certain skills in certain markets. In the emigration decision example, a case might be the emigration of another, a hate crime in one's country, a statement by a politician, and so forth. Thus, cases may or may not be accounts of similar decision problems (faced by the self or by others), and if they are, they may or may not specify outcomes and payo↵s. As in Gilboa and Schmeidler (2003, 2010) we consider databases that allow for possible repetitions of cases that are considered to be identical as far as the decision maker is concerned. A database is therefore modeled as a "counter vector", attaching an integer I (c) 0 to each "case type" c, signifying the number of times cases of this type have been encountered.
The set of all conceivable databases is divided into two -the set in which the decision maker "wakes up" to make a conscious decision, D, and the set in which she sticks with the status quo without pondering her choice, S. We state conditions on S and D, which are equivalent to the following representation: the decision maker entertains a set of "theories", T , each of which is a statistical model that assigns probabilities to cases. That is, for t 2 T , t (c) is the probability theory t assigns to a case of type c. A database I is in S if an only if
Thus, the decision maker is "inert", namely, does not make a conscious decision, precisely for the set of databases given which the theory t 0 is at least as likely as all the others. We also generalize the representation to allow for a priori preferences for some theories over others, which are combined with the likelihood function as in Akaike Information Criterion (Akaike, 1974) .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next sub-section is devoted to a discussion of related literature. Section 2 presents the model and the main result. Some extensions are presented in Section 3, while Section 4 contains a discussion. Simon (1957) and March and Simon (1958) suggested the model of "satisficing", according to which a decision maker doesn't engage in conscious optimization, but rather makes the same choices as long as her objective performance is above a certain threshold, viewed as an aspiration level. Our model follows similar lines in focusing on status quo decisions that aren't consciously, explicitly taken. As opposed to Simon's, our model does not attempt to model the choices made once a conscious decision is taken. On the other hand, the cases in our model need not be past choices by the same decision maker in a similar problem. In particular, our model more readily captures phenomena such as social learning, contagion, etc. Kahneman (2010) suggested the distinction between the fast, intuitive, "System 1 (S1)", and the slow, more rational, "System 2 (S2)". Our distinction between unconscious and conscious choices would sometimes overlap the S1/S2 distinction. Following habits and sticking with status quo decisions could be viewed as belonging to S1, especially because the rational decision process of S2 isn't invoked in these cases. However, many of the examples of decisions made by S1 aren't status quo decisions. Correspondingly, S1 might lead to decisions that would be considered mistaken for various reasons, such as biases and heuristics. Of these, our focus is only on the status quo bias, that is, on situation in which the only possible mistake is refraining from thinking.
Related Literature
Cerigioni (2017) o↵ers a model of sequential decision making, in which, as long as a decision problem is similar to past ones, the decision maker makes the same choice she made in the past, and she engages in conscious optimization only for novel problems. This is a behavioral model of the two systems, S1, S2, and their interaction. Like Cerigioni (2017), we are interested in a decision maker who sometimes makes a conscious decision and sometimes isn't. Moreover, choices that retain the status quo, such as keeping one's job or staying in one's country, can be viewed as making the same choice that has been made in similar cases in the past. However, there are several di↵erences between the models. First, ours is silent on the decision making process once it is set into motion. Second, our model allows for various cases to invoke conscious decision making, and not only the appearance of novel problems.
1 Third, Cerigioni (2017) assumes that only choices are observable, and that the existence of a conscious decision process should be inferred from them. By contrast, our model discusses circumstances under which deliberation would occur, as if the existence of such deliberation were observable. Our model is not designed to identify the existence of S1 thinking from data, but to clarify what is actually assumed when status quo decisions are modeled as if they were conscious and rational.
Model and Representation
The set of case-types is C, assumed finite, with |C| = n. A database is a function I : C ! Z + , with I = Z n + being the set of all databases. For I 2 I define |I| = P n j=1 I (j). 0 2 I denotes the origin, and summation, subtraction, multiplication by a number, and inequality on I are interpreted pointwise.
A set S ⇢ I is given, interpreted as the set of databases for which the status quo is retained. The set D = I\S is interpreted as the set of databases for which a decision will be consciously made. We assume A1. Non-triviality: 0 2 S; D 6 = ?.
Thus, A1 states that both S and D are not empty: there are databases for which the status quo will be chosen without deliberation, and there are others for which a conscious decision will be made. Moreover, in the absence of any data, the status quo will be retained.
Next, we assume the Combination condition of Gilboa and Schmeidler (2003) for the set S, but not for D. This condition states that, if two disjoint databases lead the decision maker keeping the status quo without deliberation, so should their union. In our formulation, the union is modeled by the sum of the two counter vectors that represent the databases:
The logic of this condition is the following: if a database I supports that conclusion that the current decision is the optimal one, and so does a database J, when they are taken together the conclusion can only be further reinforced. We do not assume a similar condition for the set D, because it is possible that one database, I, gives reason to believe that an act a is better than the status quo, while another, J, that an act b 6 = a is better than the status quo, but given the union, I + J, neither a nor b seems very promising, and the status quo decision can still appear to be a reasonable choice, or a safe compromise.
By contrast, if we add a database I to itself, it stands to reason that, if we start in D we will also end up in it. Thus we have
Notice that D-Replicability could follow from a condition similar to the Combination one, if I were restricted to be a replication of J. Clearly, Observation 1 Given A2 and A3, for every I 2 I and every k 2 N, I 2 S i↵ kI 2 S (and I 2 D i↵ kI 2 D).
We also adapt an Archimedean condition from Gilboa and Schmeidler (2003):
Archimedeanity states that, if database I contains su cient information to set a decision making process in motion, then, even if database J does not, su ciently many replications of I would do the same, that is, would also make the decision maker "wake up".
A theory t : C ! (0, 1) assigns weight to case type. It is implicitly assumed that this weight is independent of past cases.
Theorem 1
The following two statements are equivalent:
(ii) There exists a set of theories T with t 0 2 T , and there is a t 0 2 T with t 0 (c) t 0 (c) < 1 for some c 2 C, such that, for every I 2 I, I 2 S i↵
Thus, conditions A1-A4 are equivalent to the representation we started out with, that is, to the claim that the decision maker behaves as if she were explicitly considering a set of theories about alternative paths of action, but dismisses them based on the data.
Note that the theorem says nothing about uniqueness. It will be obvious from the proof that the representation is not unique. We only comment here that, if we multiply t(c) by a constant a c > 0 for all theories t, the representation remains valid.
A natural question to ask is, can we interpret theories as probability distributions over C? The short answer is "almost". Indeed, our representation
think of ln for all t and c. Fix a t 2 T , it is clear from the representation that the r t (c)'s are unique up to multiplication by a common factor k t > 0. To make the probabilistic interpretation rigorous, we need to find a probability t 0 2 (C) such that ⌃ c t 0 (c) exp(ktrt(c)) = 1 for all t 2 T , where t 0 (c)/exp(k t r t (c)) is the probability theory t put on case c. If we set t 0 (c) = 1/n for all c 2 C, it is not guaranteed that we can make every theory t a probability distribution over C. However, if we add an auxiliary case c 0 and set t 0 (c) = 1/(n + 1) for all c 2 C [ {c 0 }, we can pick k t > 0 close enough to 0 such that
theories in T are probability distributions over C [ {c 0 }. What's left is to understand each database I 2 I as if it contains 0 observation of case c 0 .
Extensions
In the previous section we used two assumptions that, combined, implied that I 2 S i↵ kI 2 S for all I and all natural k. This property simplifies the analysis and, in particular, allows a relatively simple condition such as Combination to imply the convexity of the set S. However, the assumption that all that matters is the relative frequency of case types in a database, and that its size has no import is somewhat restrictive. For example, a single case of a hate crime may be shrugged o↵ as an aberration, but ten repetitions of such cases may set a decision process in motion. More generally, if we take into account statistical considerations, and wish to describe a decision maker who only "wakes up" in face of accumulated evidence, we need to relax these assumptions.
We first ask the question that when we can categorize all databases into two sets S 0 and D 0 that satisfy all the conditions in Theorem 1.
A set Y ⇢ I is segment-integer-convex if, for every I, J 2 Y, and every
A5. Convexity: S is segment-integer-convex.
A5 states that if two databases don't have enough evidence against the status-quo, their "weighted average" should not be able to overturn the status quo either. < 1 for some c 2 C, such that, for every I 2 I, I 2 S 0 i↵
may be assumed rational without loss of generality.
A5'. Convexity: S is integer-convex.
This would allow us to state the following.
Theorem 3 If A1 and A5' hold, then there exists a set of theories T with |T | > 1 and t 0 2 T , and constants (d t ) t2T in (0, 1] such that, for every I 2 I,
Discussion

Axioms and Conditions
Our results deal with characterizations of certain representations. We consider a set of databases for which the status quo is retained, S, and provide conditions that are su cient, or necessary and su cient for the set to be described in a certain mathematical way. This type of exercise is often referred to as an "axiomatization". While axiomatizations are considered to be at the foundations of decision theory, one might ask, what is the point in axiomatizing, or characterizing the set S?
One reason for the interest in axiomatic systems is the need to relate theoretical concepts to observations. For example, the abstract notion of "utility" can be given meaning by its relationship to observed choices. But in our case it is not obvious that the process we deal with, namely the decision maker "waking up" to make a conscious decision, is so easily observable. 2 Another common reason to be interested in axiomatizations is normative: axioms may convince decision makers that they would like to follow a certain decision procedure (such as utility maximization, expected utility maximization, and so forth). This, however, is hardly the case here: dealing with the implicit decision whether to make an explicit decision, there seems to be little point in trying to convince one's subconsciousness how it should make its decisions.
There is, however, another reason for which axioms are useful, and this is to help economists understand when various types of models, or conceptual paradigms make sense. For example, vNM's (1944) axiomatization of expected utility maximization under risk convinced economists that this model should be the model of choice also for descriptive, and not only for normative purposes. That is, the axioms were playing a rhetorical role, but their audience was not the decision maker, but the economist who modeled decision makers. Our goal is along these lines, but it is rather modest. We do not argue that the conditions we state on the set S are necessarily very compelling, or that economists should use our representation results in future work. Rather, our goal is to clarify what is being assumed when one does not model implicit status quo decisions. An economist who would read these conditions and find them plausible would be justified in assuming that decision makers behave as if they made a conscious, explicit decision at every stage. By contrast, to the extent that these condition seem counter-intuitive, one may wish to delve deeper into the decision making process and ask what happens if and when individuals follow a status quo without making a conscious decision. For this reason we refer to our conditions as such, rather than as "axioms": we do not attempt to convince the reader that they are more or less universal principles; rather, we view them as tools that can aid in the economist's modeling decision, whether to adopt the as-if-conscious model.
Compatibility with the Bayesian Account
In our model the status quo decision is rationalized by a set of theories, of which one obtains the maximal likelihood value. There could be, however, many other ways of rationalizing status quo decisions. In particular, one may adopt a Bayesian account, according to which the decision maker starts out with a prior probability over all future observations, as well as over the outcomes all her acts might result in, and, given this prior and the observed database, she updates her beliefs and makes a decision that maximizes her (subjective, posterior) expected utility. In this model Mary's decision to keep her job can be viewed as if, every morning, she considered her career choices, and makes a decision that most of the time turns out to be to keep the status quo. Should there be any evidence that makes her change this choice, such as a negative review, it can be viewed as a signal processed by a rational decision maker in a Bayesian way, changing her posterior beliefs and thereby also her optimal choice. This approach is both insightful and powerful. Indeed, if Mary stays on her job for years, one might conclude that it probably wasn't all that bad, considering what she believed the alternatives to be. Further, there is almost no real-life event that cannot be explained, at least post-hoc, using this rational, Bayesian approach. If, given a class databases, Mary does not make a conscious decision, one can imagine a prior belief that, conditional on each of these databases, leads to a posterior according to which the status quo promises higher subjective expected utility than do its alternatives.
3 Yet, we suspect that such an explanation might be too general and becloud some behavioral patterns. For example, suppose that career changes are contagious, in the sense that one is more likely to consider one's career when one's friends do so. Career changes made by others can be viewed as signals that induce a Bayesian updating of a person's beliefs about the alternatives available to her. This would indeed be a rather convincing account of contagion if the person makes a similar career move to those made by her friends. Yet, if she makes a completely di↵erent career change, the information account might be somewhat artificial. There are situations where it would seem more natural to think of the decision maker "waking up"to consider her own problem, which might di↵er in many ways from those of her friends.
Appendix: Proofs and Related Analysis
Proof of Theorem 1:
We first present a lemma.
For any x 2 R n , an algebraically open neighborhood around x is a set E⇢ R n such that for any y 2 R n , there is an ↵ 2 (0, 1), ry + (1 r)x 2 E for all r 2 [0, ↵). Obviously, E is an algebraically open neighborhood around x if and only if we can associate each point e in the unit sphere a positive number ✏ e such that {y 2 R n : ||y x|| < ✏ (y x)/||y x|| } ⇢ E. Notice that if the ✏ e 's can be chosen uniformly over all directions, E is an open neighborhood around x.
Lemma : Let E ⇢ R n be an algebraically open neighborhood around x.
Let F ⇢ R n be a convex set. If E \ F = ;, then x / 2F . Proof. Suppose there is a sequence {x n } in F converging to x. For any set H ⇢ R n , let dim(H) be the dimension of the subspace spanned by the
Clearly m exists and 1  m  n. We know m > 1, because m = 1 will imply that the x n 's eventually converge to x from a single direction, i.e., that for some k and for all n > k, x n x are proportional, which will be in direct violation of the algebraic openness of E. Let k ⇤ be large enough so that we have m = dim({x n x} n k ⇤ ). Fix the subspace spanned by {x n x} n k ⇤ and pick m + 1 elements
) has nonempty interior relative to this subspace with the usual metric topology.
This can be done, otherwise {x n x} n k ⇤ have to be on a hyperplane passing through the origin (because x n x converges to the origin) in this subspace, which means dim({x n x} n k ⇤ ) has to be smaller than m. Consider the interior of conv({y i } m+1 i=1 ) and pick an element y 0 and an open ball B(y 0 , ✏) of radius ✏ > 0 around it in this interior. Due to the convexity of F , we have x + B(y 0 , ✏) ⇢ F . By algebraic openness of E, there is an ↵ 2 (0, 1) such that x + ↵y 0 2 E. For every n > k ⇤ , the point z
it must be the case that z n 2 B(y 0 , ✏) for large n. Then, for large n, both x + z n and x n are in F . This along with the convexity of F contradict x + ↵y 0 2 E.
A set E is algebraically open if every point in E has an algebraically open neighborhood in E.
Corollary 2: Let E ⇢ R n be an algebraically open set. If E c is convex,
then E is open.
Proof. Every point in E has an algebraically open neighborhood in E that is disjoint from E c . Hence, E \ E c = ;. Corollary 3: Given a convex set F ⇢ R n and a point x / 2 F . If for any y 2 F , there is an ↵ 2 (0, 1) such that ry + (1 r)x / 2 E for all r 2 [0, ↵). Then, x is not in the closure of F .
Proof. The argument used in the lemma only requires the existence of ↵ for directions coming from set F .
Two observations about the Archimedeanity condition are due here. First, the Archimedeanity property also holds for J 2 D. Because, for any J 2 D, if J + I 2 D, we are done. If J + I 2 S, we apply the Archimedeanity condition to J + I and get (J + I) + kI 2 D for some k 2 N.
Second, for any I 2 D and any J 2 I, there exists positive integer K such that for all k > K, kI + J 2 D. If k 1 < k 2 < k 3 and both k 1 I + J and k 3 I + J are in S, we must have k 2 I + J = ↵(k 1 I + J) + (1 ↵)(k 3 I + J) for some ↵ 2 Q\(0, 1). Then, there exists positive integers n and m, such that ↵ = m n thus n(k 2 I + J) = m(k 1 I + J) + (n m)(k 3 I + J). Since S combination says m(k 1 I + J) + (n m)(k 3 I + J) 2 S, by Observation 1 it must be the case that k 2 I + J 2 S. Successive applications of Archimedeanity show that there are infinitely many ks such that kI + J 2 D. So, by the above argument, we can't have infinitely many ks such that kI + J 2 S.
We now proceed to the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof: (ii) implies (i) is obvious. We thus focus on showing that (i) implies (ii).
We extend the databases from I = Z n + to Q n + . For any I 2 Q n + , find a q 2 Z + such that qI 2 I and let I 2 D if and only if qI 2 D. This is well defined because both D and S have the replicability property. The union of these extended two disjoint regions is Q n + . We still call them D and S respectively.
By replicability, we have I 2 D if and only if qI 2 D for all q 2 Q + .
Due to S-combination, it must be true that for any I, J 2 S, pI + qJ 2 S for all p, q 2 Q + . Moreover, this implies for any
.., l. The Archimedeanity condition implies that given any I 2 D and J 2 Q n + , there is a r
We want to show that the closure of S in R n + , denoted byS, is a closed convex cone. It is closed by definition and it is convex because it is also the closure of a convex set conv(S) , i.e., the convex hull of S in R n + . To see it is a cone, assume that I 2S is the limit of a sequence {I n } in S and let q be in Q + . Since {qI n } must converge to qI, we have I 2S if and only if qI 2S for all q 2 Q + . By the closedness ofS, it must be the case that qI 2S for all q 2 R + . Hence,S is a closed convex cone.
Next we showS \ D = ;. We have D \ conv(S) = ;, because every rational point in conv(S) can be obtained as a convex combination of points in S using only rational coe cients, and thus every such rational point is in S and not in D. Then, the result follows from Corollary 3 because Q is a field.
Given any 2 R n , let c = inf x2S x · . BecauseS is a cone, it must be the case that c 2 { 1, 0}. Let B = { 2 R n : || || 1 = 1, c = 0}, where
The supporting halfspace associated with a vector 2 B is denoted by H = {x 2 R n : x · 0}. It's well known thatS = \ 2B H . Thus, we conclude that, for all I 2 I, I is in S if and only if, for every 2 B we have ⌃ c2C I(c) (c) 0. Define a theory t 0 by t 0 (c) = 1/n for all c 2 C. We present a stronger notion of Archimedeanity for reference. A4'. Archimedeanity: If J + I 2 D for some J 2 S, then for any J 0 2 S, there exists positive integer k such that kI + J 0 2 D.
Remark: Define S 0 = {I 2 I : kI 2 S, f or all k 2 N}. The A4'
Archimedean condition is equivalent to the statement that given any database J in S, J + kI is in S for all k 2 N if and only if I is in S'.
We now proceed to the proof of Theorem 2. We first present two observations. First, for any I 2 D, if k 1 < k 2 < k 3 and both k 1 I +J and k 3 I +J are in S, segment-integer convexity of S implies that k 2 I + J 2 S. This along with the Archimedeanity condition, implies there can not exist infinitely many ks such that kI + J 2 S. Thus, there is a positive integer K such that for all k > K, kI + J 2 D.
Second, given 0 2 S, D-replicability is implied by the segment-integer convexity of S. If I 2 D and kI 2 S for some k > 1, then
which is a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 2: Recall that S 0 = {I 2 I : kI 2 S, f or all k 2 N},
We first give a characterization of D 0 : for any J 2 D 0 , then there is a
the number k(J) = max{k 2 Z + : kJ 2 S} is well defined because 0 2 S together with the (segment-integer) convexity of S imply at most finitely many kJs are in S. Then, for I = k(J) · J 2 S we have I + J 2 D. Proof of Theorem 3: For any 2 R n , let c = inf I2S ⌃ (i)I(i). Clearly, every c is nonpositive because 0 is in S. Let B = { 2 R n : || || 1 = 1, c 6 = 4 If we have A4' instead of A4, the converse of this observation is also true and thus we have D 0 = {I 2 I : 9J 2 S, J + I 2 D}. This is because if we have J + I 2 D for some J 2 S, then, by A4' applied for J 0 = 0, we can not have kI 2 S for all k 2 N, i.e. I / 2 S 0 and thus I 2 D 0 .
1}. Then, we have conv(S) \ Z n + = \ 2B {x 2 Z n + : x · c }.
Define a theory t 0 by t 0 (c) = 1/n for all c 2 C. For every 2 B, define a parameter d = exp(c ) and define a theory t by letting t (c) = the hyperplane I(2) = p 2(I(1) 2), i.e. some database in D sneaks in the supporting hyperplanes. Notice that this won't be a problem if we just characterize conv(S), since (2, 0) is not in that closure. But, if the essential decision process is driven by the two theories revealed by S 0 , characterizing conv(S) will introduce many extra theories whose existence is simply due to the discreteness of integers.
Example 2: Boundary 1 connects (0,0) to the ray starting from (2,1) with a 45 degree angle. Boundary 2 connects (0,0) to the ray starting from (1,2) with a 45 degree angle. Let S be the set of all the integer points on and between these two boundaries. S 0 = {I 2 Z , 2). Boundary 1 connects (0,0) to the ray starting from (2,1) with slope ↵. Boundary 2 connects (0,0) to the ray starting from (1,2) with slope ↵. Let S be the set of all the integer points on and between these two boundaries. Because {n↵ mod 1 : n 2 N} is dense in [0, 1], S must contain infinitely many databases. But, in this example we have S 0 = {0}.
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